Pension Portability and Labour Mobility in the United States. New Evidence from SIPP Data by Andrietti, Vincenzo & Hildebrand, Vincent
Pension Portability and Labour Mobility in
the United States. New Evidence from SIPP
Data.
Vincenzo Andrietti¤ Vincent Hildebrand
Universidad Carlos III, Madrid York University, Toronto
and CeRP, University of Turin and CEPS-INSTEAD
March 15, 2001
Abstract
We explore the role of employer provided pensions on job mobility
choices using data from the Survey of Income and Program Partici-
pation. De…ned bene…t plans are found to have a signi…cant negative
e¤ect on mobility. However, we …nd no signi…cant evidence that the
potential pension portability losses deter job mobility among work-
ers covered by these plans. We also …nd that the portability policy
change implemented by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 had only minor
e¤ects on mobility. Puzzlingly, de…ned contribution plans, although
fully portable, are found to have an impact similar to de…ned bene…t
plans. Evidence of compensation premiums accruing to workers in
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1pension, union and health insurance covered jobs supports the view
that workers are less likely to leave ”good jobs”.
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21 Introduction
The question of employer provided pensions’ portability in the United States
has been widely debated within the ”new pension economics” literature. Us-
ing di¤erent empirical approaches, Allen, Clark andMcDermed (1988, 1993),
Ippolito (1985, 1987), and Gustman and Steinmeier (1987, 1993, 1995) all in-
vestigate whether a lack ofpension portability is primarily responsible for the
lower job mobility rate observed among pension covered workers. However,
no consensus emerged from those studies. Futhermore, the evidence they
provide is based on data collected during the late 1970s and early 1980s,
that cannot re‡ect the rapid changes experienced by the US pension and
labour markets in the last two decades.
First, there is substantial evidence1 that employer provided pension cov-
erage has signi…cantly declined among young males. Structural changes in
thelabour andpension markets have been advanced as possible explanations.
A second development is the shift from de…ned bene…t toward de…ned contri-
bution plans. The rapid growth of de…ned contribution plans is expected to
a¤ect both job mobility and future retirement income as well as the structure
of wages. Under de…ned bene…ts plans, workers accumulate lower retirement
bene…ts when they change employers frequently. In contrast, job changes
have relatively little impact on future retirement bene…ts for those enrolled
in de…ned contribution plans. This implies that in the future mobile work-
1See, among others, Even and Macperson (1994).
3ers may enter retirement with larger total pension bene…ts than in the past,
although the adequacy of retirement income provided by de…ned contribu-
tion plans is widely debated. Furthermore, de…ned contribution plans place
greater responsibility and investment risks on the individual worker. In a
competitive setting, such a risk shift is likely to induce higher compensa-
tion levels as compensating di¤erentials to employees, which also potentially
a¤ect mobility.
In order to account for these developments and to contribute to a better
understanding of the pension-mobility relationship in the US, we use data
drawn from di¤erent survey years of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) spanning 1984 to 1994. In contrast with the limited
interpretability of reduced form estimates provided by most of the previ-
ous studies, we estimate a structural model similar to that of Gustman and
Steinmeier (1993). The advantage of the structural approach is that it allows
one to separately identify the impact of employer provided pensions (either
de…ned bene…t or de…ned contribution plans), and of prospective wage dif-
ferentials on the probability of individual job mobility.
However, our modeling di¤ers from Gustman and Steinmeier (1993) in
two main respects. First, we correct for the potential endogeneity of mobility
choices by estimating a more general sample selection model. Second, we
adopt a speci…cation which allows us to disentangle the e¤ects of the various
fringe bene…ts including de…ned bene…t and de…ned contribution pensions
as well as health insurance coverage. In addition, the period covered by our
4data allows us to examine the e¤ect on individual mobility of the reduction
in vesting period introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
We …nd that workers covered by de…ned bene…t pensions are signi…cantly
less likely to move. However, the potential portability loss arising to work-
ers leaving a de…ned bene…t plan does not seem to play a signi…cant role in
explaining job mobility choices. Our results also reveal that de…ned contribu-
tion plans, despite of their complete portability, are as important as de…ned
bene…t plans in reducing job mobility. In addition, employer provided health
insurance and union coverage are also found to play a major role in deterring
job mobility. These results seem to undermine the argument that the lack
of pension portability is a key factor in explaining the lower mobility rate
observed among workers in pension covered jobs. Evidence of compensation
premiums in pension and health insurance covered jobs further supports the
alternative view that workers in ”good jobs” are simply less likely to move.
From a policy perspective, these results cast doubts on the e¤ectiveness
of reforms aimed at improving labour market e¢ciency through portability
measures. On the other hand, the data do suggest that pension portability
reforms have improved the retirement income prospects of mobile workers
by some 46%. So while our estimates of behavioural responses suggest that
the Act had almost no impact on job mobility, it may have succeeded with
respect to the complementary goal of ensuring adequate retirement incomes.
The paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 discusses the main issues
surrounding pension portability as well as the related empirical literature.
5Section 3 introduces our structural model of inter…rm job mobility. Section 4
describes the dataset usedforthe empirical analysis and presentspreliminary
evidence on the relationship between pension coverage, mobility and wages.
Section 5 reports the empirical results obtained from the estimation of our
model. Section 6 provides a summary and a policy oriented discussion of the
results.
2 Pension Portability: Issues and Previous
Literature
In general, pension portability can be de…ned as the capacity of workers
covered by an employer provided pension plan to carry the actuarially fair
value of their accrued rights from one job to the next. When a mover is
not entitled to full preservation of his/her accrued rights, either in the old
or in the new scheme, a portability loss is expected to arise. The latter
can be de…ned as the shortfall of actual retirement bene…ts from those that
would have been paid if there had been no change in scheme membership as
a consequence of job separations during the career.
It is important to emphasize that the pension portability issue is strictly
tied to the nature of the pension contract. Employer provided pension plans
can be divided into two broad categories: de…ned bene…t and de…ned con-
tribution plans. In a traditional de…ned bene…t plan, each employee’s future
bene…t is determined by a speci…c formula, and the plan provides a nominal
6level of bene…ts upon retirement. The typical ”…nal pay” formula relates
pension bene…ts to the length of service and to the …nal salary received, with
the pension promise being usually funded through employers’ contributions.
De…ned contribution plans provide for periodic contributions into an indi-
vidual pension account for each worker. The contributions may be made by
the …rm and/or the worker. The level of bene…t at retirement is determined
by the total amount of contributions made and the rate of return of each
individual’s retirement assets. Although di¤erent types of de…ned contribu-
tion plans2 are o¤ered in the United States, most of them have the so called
401(k) option which allows participant employees to make pre-tax contribu-
tions. Employers could establish 401(k) plans that rely entirely on voluntary
employee contributions. However, they usually o¤er matching contributions
up to a limit.
In the United States, individuals enrolled in pension plans, either of the
de…ned bene…t or de…ned contribution type, usually gain nonforfeitable and
inalienable (vested) rights to pension bene…ts after meeting speci…c service
and/or age requirements3. Prior to the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act (ERISA) of 1974, there were no required standards for the vesting
of pension bene…ts. ERISA …rst established a 10 year vesting standard. The
2Money purchase plans, saving and thrift plans, pro…t sharing plans, stock bonus plans
and employee stock ownership plans.
3These can include a minimum (or maximum) eligibility age for plan participation
and/or a minimum waiting service period in addition to the vesting period usually required
in order to be entitled to any pension bene…t.
7Tax Reform Act of 1986 further reduced the vesting period, allowing private
single employer plans to provide either full (cli¤) vesting after 5 years of ser-
vice (with nopartial vestingbefore that time) or gradedvesting of 20 percent
after 3 years of service and 20 percent for each subsequent year of service,
with full vesting reached after 7 years of service4.
Currently, most de…ned contribution plans allow for the immediate vest-
ing of employee contributions, while virtually all de…nedbene…t plans impose
…ve years vesting. However, vesting is neither the only nor the most impor-
tant element to consider in evaluating the portability of employer provided
pensions. While mobility restrictions implied by vesting rules have been
found to be insigni…cant in most empirical studies5, a more relevant porta-
bility issue arises to workers covered by de…ned bene…t plans6. The typical
structure of such plans implies that upon leaving a job before retirement,
vested workers are entitled to a deferred retirement pension annuity deter-
mined on the basis of earnings received upon leaving the …rm. In the U.S.
deferred annuities are not indexed to in‡ation or to productivity growth.
Thus, vested workers who move across …rms with identical de…ned bene…t
pension plans and o¤ering similar wage pro…les, will accumulate lower total
4The new vesting provisions applied to pension rights accrued after January 1, 1989.
5See, for example, Allen, Clark and McDermeed (1988, 1993).
6A necessary condition for the rise of portability losses is that de…ned bene…t pensions
are interpreted as implicit contracts under which workers accept to forego wages pro-
portional to retirement pension bene…ts conditional upon remaining with the …rm until
retirement against the …rm’s promise to preserve the employment relationship and to pay
the agreed pension bene…ts upon worker’s retirement (Ippolito, 1985).
8pension bene…ts than workers who remain with the same …rm throughout
their career7.
In contrast, workers covered by de…ned contribution plans typically do
not incur such capital losses when they change employers. In general, these
workers have a legal claim on a pension account in which all pension con-
tributions have been invested. If the funds remain in an account after the
worker leaves the …rm, the account will continue to growby the accumulated
returns on invested assets. Alternatively, the funds can be withdrawn from
the pension account of a former employer and either rolled over into an in-
dividual retirement account (IRA) or in a new pension account. In either
case, the worker who has changed jobs retains the full value of the pension
funds. Thus, in general, de…ned contribution plans are portable and workers
can change jobs without su¤ering any loss in future pension bene…ts.
The possible consequences of the lack of portability of de…ned bene…t
plans on individual job mobility choices have been widely investigated in the
US pension literature. Using simple statistical models (such as probit mod-
els explaining job change8, or hazard models9 explaining job tenure), early
empirical studies documented a signi…cant negative correlation between pen-
sions and job mobility. The ”new pension economics” literature of the early
1990s developed di¤erent modelling approaches to further investigate this
7See Andrietti (2000) for a detailed exposition of the pension loss computation method-
ology.
8Mitchell (1983).
9Wolf and Levy (1984).
9stylized fact. The major explanations advanced for the negative relationship
between pension coverage and turnover include, in addition to the expected
portability losses, the compensation premiums accruing to pension covered
workers10 or the ”self-selection” of immobile workers into pension covered
jobs11.
In Allen, Clark and McDermed (1993) pension portability losses are as-
sumed to act both as a mobility deterrent for pension covered workers and
as a self-selection device, inducing ”stable” workers to join pension covered
jobs while screening out workers who are likely to quit or to be laid o¤.
Both the decision to join a pension covered job and the job mobility deci-
sion conditional on pension status are treated as endogenous, in order to
establish if the lower turnover rates of pension covered workers can fully be
explained by unobservable heterogeneity. Estimating a switching bivariate
probit model of pension coverage and turnover on 1975-1982 PSID data the
authors conclude that the main reason why a lower turnover rate is observed
among workers covered by de…ned bene…t pensions seems to be the prospect
of a pension wealth loss. In contrast, they …nd little evidence of sorting on
unobservables12.
10Gustman and Steinmeier (1993).
11Allen, Clark and McDermed (1993), Ippolito (1997).
12A theoretical extension to the self-selection argument has been proposed by Ippolito
(1997). Assuming that workers can be classi…ed as ”low” or ”high” discounters and that
low discounters have some characteristics that is ex-ante unobservable but valuable to the
…rm (such as higher productivity or lower turnover rates), he argues that DC plans, as well
as de…ned bene…t plans, are natural candidates for sorting workers on the basis of their
10Using the 1984 release of SIPP, Gustman and Steinmeier (1993) develop
a research approach similar to the one adopted in this paper. The authors
question the causal interpretation usually attributed to the strong negative
correlation between pension coverage and job mobility. Rather, they look for
other causal factors whose omission could have generated this correlation. In
particular, they suggestthat the causalitymay run from theimplicit contract,
interpreted as theomittedfactor, to mobility and pension design. As implicit
contracts may provide the payment of compensation premiums to pension
covered workers, the authors model the relative role of lifetime e¢ciency
wage premiums and pension portability losses on individual job mobility.
They assume that there is no separate role for pension coverage beyond its
monetary in‡uence. Thus, in their speci…cation, pension coverage is not
included in the mobility equation but its monetary e¤ect is incorporated
in their measure of lifetime wage di¤erential (referred to by Gustman and
Steinmeier (1993) as the compensation premium). This assumption does not
allow them to distinguish between the mobility e¤ects of de…ned bene…t and
de…ned contribution pensions13. Furthermore, our speci…cation also includes
important potential mobility predictors such as employer provided health
insurance coverage.
unobserved discount rate. In particular the backloaded structure of DB plans attract low
discounters, while the actuarially fair lump sums provided to early leavers by DC plans
encourage the departure of mistakenly hired high discounters early in tenure.
13However, they provide some evidence of the unexpected role of de…ned contribution
plans in preventing mobility in the estimation of their reduced form mobility equation.
11Imposing joint normality on the wage and the mobility equation error
terms, they estimate a self-selection model through a maximum likelihood
procedure. However, their self-selection mechanism di¤ers from standard
models with endogenous switching, including the one estimated in this pa-
per. In particular, the estimation of their wage di¤erential parameter does
not explicitly account forpotential sample selection intomover/stayer status.
In their approach, the wage di¤erential is just given by the di¤erence between
the current and alternative wages actually observed for movers. The usual
approach is to derive the wage di¤erential from counterfactual imputations.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1993) procedure provides them with enough in-
formation to estimate an additional (incidental) parameter - the correlation
among unobservables in the current and alternative wage equations - whichis
not identi…ed in the standard setting of a regression model with endogenous
switching.
Their …ndings suggest that e¢ciency wage premiums rather than back-
loaded pension accrual patterns are the primary cause oflower turnover rates
among workers covered by de…ned bene…t plans.
This briefoverviewreveals the absence of a common viewin the literature
regarding the role played by …nancial (pension loss) disincentives, compen-
sation premiums and self-selection in explaining the lower mobility rates of
pension covered workers. The main objective of this paper is to shed some
more light on the role of pension portability losses and compensation premi-
ums on the individual job mobility choices in the US using more recent data
12sources. Moreover, the period covered by our data allows us to examine the
e¤ect of a policy change - the reduction of the vesting period introduced by
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on individual job mobility.
3 The Model
Our model14 focuses on the role played by structural wage di¤erentials and
expected portability losses in the job mobility decision, while testing for the
existence of compensation premiums accruing to pension covered workers.
The model is based on a binary representation of the job mobility decision.
Individuals are assumed to observe both their current and their best alterna-
tive lifetime wage earnings pro…le. They also perceive a variety of pecuniary
and non-pecuniary mobility costs either due to the loss of accumulated …rm
speci…c human capital, …rm speci…c bene…ts (including pension and health
coverage) or related to their family background. In addition to losing pen-
sion coverage, workers covered by de…ned bene…t plans also expect to su¤er
a pension wealth loss while moving to a new job, due to the limited portabil-
ity of their accrued pension rights. Inter…rm job mobility in this framework
represents basically a response to perceived net gains: a worker is expected
to move if the discounted returns to a new job exceed the sum of the dis-
counted returns to the current job and the discounted costs of moving15. For
14See Andrietti (2000).
15In this model, we need to impose two assumptions in order to impute the expected
pension portability loss. First, we assume that movers change jobs only once in their
13this reason, one shouldinterpret quits as the appropriate dependent variable.
However, because of the poor quality of the information in the SIPP on sep-
aration type (quit versus layo¤), we consider an individual to be a mover as
long as a transition to a new job has occurred, independently of the cause
of separation. This assumption is consistent with the theoretical argument16
that in an e¢cient turnover framework a truly meaningful distinction cannot
be made between quits and layo¤s since workers wishing to quit could in-
duce a layo¤, while …rms desiring a layo¤ could induce a quit. We therefore
implicitly assume all turnover to be ”e¢cient” irrespective of who initiates
it. The mobility choice of individual i is represented by the binary random
variable Ii = 1fI¤
i > 0g;where 1f¢g is the usual indicator function and I¤
i is
the lifetime net gain from mobility. We specify the latter as follows:
I¤
i ´ Ymi ¡ Ysi ¡ Ci R 0; (1)
where Ymi is the expected present value of lifetime earnings on the assump-
tion that the individual moves into his/her best alternative job, Ysi is the
expected present value of lifetime earnings on the assumption that the in-
dividual remains in his/her current job, Ci is the expected present value
of costs associated with mobility. The individual mobility choice in (1) is
based on an ex-ante comparison. The individual moves to a di¤erent job
working life. Second, we assume that the alternative wage o¤er matches the current wage.
These assumptions are likely to underestimate the pension portability loss.
16Borjas and Rosen (1980) and McLaughlin (1991) provide empirical support to this
argument.
14if his/her expected lifetime earnings gains exceed mobility costs. Otherwise
he/she stays in his/her current job. In representing the individual decision
empirically we have two main problems. First, we do not observe lifetime
wage earnings for actual movers and stayers. We assume current earnings
to be the best predictor of lifetime earnings17. The second, and even more
important, problem is that we cannot observe the counterfactual wage for
each individual, that is what the individual would have earned had he/she
taken the alternative mobility choice. What we observe is the wage condi-
tional on the choice actually taken. In order to obtain predictions of the
counterfactual wage for each individual we use the estimated coe¢cients of
the actual movers and stayers. Given that the event fI¤
i > 0g is equivalent
to the event fI+
i > 0g, where I+
i = I¤
i=Ysi and that mobility costs are not
directly observable, we can specify the selection index as follows:
I¤
i = °(lnYmi ¡ lnYsi)¡ ¯0
cXci ¡ vci; (2)
where Xci is a vector of personal and jobspeci…c mobility costs predictors, ¯c
is a vector of unknown parameters, and vci is a continuous random variable
17Another approach would have been to assume a constant, but unobserved, rate of
future wage growth, discounting back at a constant interest rate the streams of future
wages and assuming that the individual stays in his/her job until retirement, on the basis
of the following formula:





where ge is the expected nominal rate of wage growth and ie is the expected nominal
discount rate. However, these approaches are similar in that both implicitly assume that
available information about current wages is indicative of lifetime wages.
15distributed independently of Xci with zero mean and variance ¾2
c. Wage





sXi + vsi; (4)
where lnYmi is the natural logarithm of hourly net wages for movers, lnYsi
is the natural logarithm of hourly net wages for stayers, Xi is a vector of
personal and job speci…c variables including education, experience and its
square, occupational pension, health insurance and union coverage, industry,
occupation, residential and location dummies, ¯m;¯s are vectors of unknown
parameters, and vmi;vsi are continuous random errors containing unobserv-
able variables, such as individual abilities and speci…c capital that are useful
in the chosen job, distributed independently of Xi with zero mean and un-
known variances ¾2
m;¾2
s. Equations (2);(3); and (4) represent the structural
model of inter…rm job mobility. Substituting from (4) and (3) into (2) yields
a reduced form selection index:
I¤
i ´ ¯
0Wi + vi; (5)
where Wi=[Xi;Xci]; ¯ =[°(¯m ¡ ¯s);¡¯c]; and vi = (°(vmi ¡ vsi) ¡ vci):
Since the parameters of the reduced form probit equation are estimable only
up to a scale factor, we can assume, without any loss of generality, that vi
has a unit variance. The decision rule (5) selects individuals into movers and
stayers according to their largest expected present value. Therefore, wages
16actually observed in each group are not random samples of the population,
but truncated samples. The expected value of worker i’s wage conditional
on observed characteristics and mobility status is:
E(lnYmijWi;Ii = 1) = ¯
0
mXi +E(vmijWi;Ii = 1); (6)
E(lnYsijWi;Ii = 0) = ¯
0
sXi + E(vsijWi;Ii = 0): (7)
Knowledge of the functional form of the conditional mean errors allows es-
timation of the model parameters. Assumingthat the errorterms(vmi;vsi;vi)
are independent of (Xi;Wi) and have a trivariate normal distribution, with
















equations (6)¡ (7) may be rewritten as:
E(lnYmijWi;Ii = 1) = ¯
0
mXi + ¾mv¸mi; (8)
E(lnYsijWi;Ii = 0) = ¯
0





1¡©(¯0Wi) are the inverse Mills’ ratios; with
Á(¢) and©(¢) being thestandardnormal density and cumulative distribution
function respectively. Selectivity bias in wage equations estimation arises
from any correlation between the unobserved determinants of inter…rm job
mobility and wages. Only if such a correlation were not present, the usual
ordinary least square method could be used to consistently estimate ¯j on
17the selected subsample. In general, however, this does not occur. Consistent
estimates oftheabove model are obtainedbyapplying Heckman’s(1979)two-
stagemethod. Wageequations’ estimatedcoe¢cients are thenusedtopredict
log-wage earnings for each individual i; given his/her own characteristics Xi :
ln ~ Ymi = ^ ¯
0
mXi + ^ ¾mv^ ¸mi; (10)
ln ~ Ysi = ^ ¯
0
sXi + ^ ¾sv^ ¸si; (11)
and to compute the individual ex-ante structural wage di¤erential:
ln ~ Ymi ¡ ln ~ Ysi = (^ ¯
0
m ¡ ^ ¯
0
s)Xi + (^ ¾mv^ ¸mi ¡ ^ ¾sv^ ¸si): (12)
This measure has two components: the …rst term is the structural mobil-
ity wage gain, representing the di¤erence between systematic components of
wages in the alternative as well as in current job, while the second term ac-
counts for random di¤erences not captured by wage equations but important
in determining the job mobility decision. The structural wage di¤erential is
then substituted in (2) to obtain a structural probit function:
I¤
i = °(ln ~ Ymi ¡ ln ~ Ysi) ¡ ¯
0
cXci + "i; (13)
where: "i = °(^ vmi ¡ ^ vsi)¡ vi:
Maximum likelihood estimation18 of equation (14) allows us to obtain es-
timates of the structural parameters related to the principal determinants of
18While we do not correct the variance covariance matrix of these estimates for the fact
that the structural wage di¤erential is only an estimate of the true one (see Murphy and
Topel, (1985), Greene (2000) or Peracchi (2001)), we do allow for heteroskedasticity by
applying White’s Variance-Covariance Matrix Correction.
18the individual mobility choice. Estimation of the model requires identifying
exclusion restrictions. First, identi…cation of wage equations parameters re-
quires that at least one exogenous variable determining mobility cost (Xci)
not be a determinant of wages (Xi)19. Second, identi…cation of the wage
di¤erential parameter (°) in the structural probit equation requires that at
least one exogenous variable determining wages (Xi) be excluded from the
structural mobility cost (Xci): Both these conditions are satis…ed by our
underlying economic model. The reduced form selection index contains vari-
ables included in Xci but excluded from Xi. In particular, demographic
information, pension, union and health coverage, expected pension loss, em-
ployer provided training and …rm size dummies - all referring to …rst period
of observation - are included in the reduced form probit but excluded from
the wage equations providing appropriate and statistically signi…cant instru-
ments to identify the coe¢cients of the latters. The wage equations include
residential and location dummies, pension, union and health coverage dum-
mies as well as occupation and industry information - all referring to the
second period job - which are excluded from the mobility cost vector (Xci):
A further identifying covariance restriction, ¾ms = 0, accounts for the fact
that sample observations cannot re‡ect the correlation between lnYmi and
lnYsi. Parametric estimation of sample selection models exploits the rela-
19This avoids multicollinearity between regressors in the wage equation in case of linear-
ity of the inverse Mills’ ratio. However, in principle identi…cation could be attained even
only relying on non linearity of the latter.
19tionships between selection and outcome equations’ errors operating through
distributional assumptions. In particular the joint normality assumption im-
plies linear relationships between selection and outcomes equations’ errors.
Sample selection models based on normality have been criticized on grounds
ofa seeming lack of robustness of the parameters estimates to mispeci…cation
of the maintained distributional assumptions20. The most recent literature
proposes a semiparametric approach, in that the outcome equation error
conditional on the selected regime is not implicitly, (through distributional
assumptions) or explicitly assumed to be a linear function of the selection’s
equation error. Rather, this relationship is represented by an unknown func-
tion. However, recent evidence providedby Newey, Powell and Walker (1990)
and Lanot and Walker (1998) indicates that semiparametric methods give
similar results to Heckman’s two-step parametric procedure. Although this
evidence should be taken cautiously, it provides us with a rationale for using
the parametric approach.
4 Data: The Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP)
The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is a set of indepen-
dent short panels. In each survey, the data are collected every four months
usually for 8 waves. As a result, a typical survey year covers a time span of
20See Heckman and Honoré (1990).
2032 months. In each survey one can di¤erentiate between the core module and
topical module information. The core data are collected in every wave, while
the topical module contains an additional set of questions addressing a par-
ticular research topic which does not require updating with each wave. This
paper focuses on the mobility of US males aged between 31 and 50 working
at least 30 hours per week in the private non-agricultural sector. We use the
survey years 1984, 1986, 1990 and 1992 for which detailed topical module in-
formation on pensions is available. The actual period covered by the pooled
sample spans the 10 years between 1984 and 1994. We start the empirical
analysis by providing some preliminary evidence on pension coverage rates
and on the relationship between pensions, wages and job mobility.
Table 1 presents evidence of a decline in male pension coverage over the
1980s21, while …gures reported in Table 2 are consistent with the well known
shift from de…ned bene…t to de…ned contribution coverage, in particular to-
ward401(k)plans. One shouldinterpret thelatter tablecarefully as it reports
individual coverage by plan type following the structure of the SIPP pension
questionnaires22. While 401(k) and pro…t sharing plans are included in the
usual de…nition of de…ned contribution coverage by the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics, the SIPP pension topical modules include speci…c questions for each
21Although in 1992 there is a slight recovery. Pension coverage is de…ned here as any
form of employer provided pension coverage, without distinction between de…ned bene…t
and de…ned contribution, pro…t sharing or 401(k) plans. Statistics are computed on the
selected sample.
22See Gustman and Steinmeier (1993).
21of these plan categories. However, the question on pro…t sharing coverage is
not askedin 1992. This couldexplainthe strongriseofthe 401(k) share inthe
1992 pension coverage distribution. In order to adopt a consistent de…nition
for each survey year, we include pro…t sharing and 401(k) in our de…nition of
de…ned contribution coverage. This grouping is meaningful given the de…ned
contribution nature of 401(k) and pro…t sharing plans, although it confounds
the di¤erent contributory rules between the plans.
Although the information necessary to di¤erentiate quits from layo¤s is
available in the SIPP data, it does not appear to be very reliable. Therefore,
we consider that a transition has occurred if we can identify a separation
from the initial job during the one year time window between wave 4 and
wave 7. As pointed out by Gustman and Steinmeier (1993), several variables,
such as the randomly assigned job number or direct questions to employees,
could be used to identify mobility in the SIPP data. However, the mobility
information derived from these variables is often contradictory. Therefore,
following Gustman and Steinmeier (1993), we adopt a broad de…nition of
mobility, that de…nes a transition to a new job to have occurred as long as
one of those variables indicates a job change.
In Tables 3 to 6, we present basic statistics on mobility rates and wages
by pension coverage status. A number of interesting …ndings emerges from
these tables. We …nd the well-known negative relationship between de…ned
bene…t pension coverage and mobility rates. Non covered workers have mo-
bility rates ranging from 27.8 to 32.7 percent while much lower mobility rates
22characterize pension covered workers. In particular, this negative relation-
ship holds not only for workers covered by de…ned bene…t pensions but also
for those covered by de…ned contribution plans. Workers reporting double
coverage have the lowest mobility rate in all survey years.
Pension covered workers, either stayers or movers, are on average better
paid than workers without pensions in all the survey years23. This could
re‡ect either worker speci…c or job speci…c attributes. If the entire wage
di¤erential between workers with and without pension was due to individ-
ual characteristics, such as unmeasured ability, the wage on any alternative
job would be identical to the current one, and no wage losses would result
from a move. If the wage on the current job was instead just a re‡ection
of job speci…c rather than personal characteristics, identical workers would
be paid more on pension jobs than on non-pension jobs, either as a result
of rent-sharing or because of some productivity enhancing-scheme requiring
e¢ciency wage payments. Raw evidence from tables 3 to 7 is consistent with
the latter interpretation. Table 7 indicates that most (86 percent) pension
coveredmovers lose pension coverage24 andthus move to jobs associated with
lower average wages.
23This gap is particularly large for people reporting double coverage.
24Information on pension coverage on the new job is collected by means of a topical
module in wave 7 only for the 1984 and 1986 survey years. Alternatively, no wave 7
pension topical module was asked in the 1990s surveys. Pension coverage in wave 7 is an
important variable in the estimation of our empirical model. We impute this variable for
the 1990s running a probit for pension coverage status change among movers in the 1980s.
235 Empirical Results
The model is estimated on the pooled sample of the four surveys with a set
of panel dummies25. Table 8 reports results from …rst-step reduced form
probit estimation. The estimates provide very limited information about the
validity of the theoretical framework captured by equations (2)¡(4), giving
only the total e¤ect of each regressor on the probability of job mobility.
Moreover, the sign of most variables included in the reduced form probit
equationis a priori uncertain, andtheestimatedcoe¢cientvalues are di¢cult
to interpret. The reduced form estimates are however the necessary …rst step
toward the construction of the inverse Mills’ ratios, use to derive Heckman’s
(1979) two step consistent estimates of the wage equations.
5.1 Selection Corrected Wage Equations
In Table 9 we present the estimated sample-selection corrected wage equa-
tions for movers and stayers. The dependent variable is the log of hourly
wages expressed in 1992 constant dollars. The reported t-values are com-
puted correcting the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated coe¢cients
with the Heckman procedure26. Most of the selection of individuals into the
25We have tested the pooling of data from di¤erent combinations of panels and in no
case the data reject the null hypothesis of common parameters. The year dummy variables
are not reported in the tables.
26See Heckman (1979). The routine for computation of the correct standard errors,
programmed in Stata - version 7 - is available upon request from the authors. Reported
t-values followed by one (two) asterisks are signi…cant at 90 (95) percent level.
24observed mover/stayer status seems to come from unobservables, although
theselectione¤ect captured by ^ ¾mv^ ¸mi and ^ ¾sv^ ¸si is negativeboth for movers
and for stayers. The coe¢cients of ”measurable” variables obtained in the
wage equation (either for stayers or movers) con…rm a priori expectations.
More precisely, being white, married, professional, employed in a medium or
large …rm (over 100 employees) as well as in a manufacturing …rm and living
in a SMSA are all signi…cantly associated with higher earnings. Similarly,
the returns to education are positive and statistically signi…cant.
The wage equations include dummy variables for de…ned bene…t and de-
…ned contribution pension coverage. These provide a test for the existence
of a wage premium accruing to pension covered workers after controlling for
individual and job speci…c characteristics. The regression results corrobo-
rate the correlation reported in the descriptive statistics: being in a pension
covered job (either in de…ned bene…t or de…ned contribution plan) generally
gives positive and statistically signi…cant returns in wages. The regression
results reveal that the premium associated with being covered by a de…ned
bene…t plan (or by a de…ned contribution plan) is much smaller for stayers
than for movers. Interestingly, a similar result is found for both employees
with health coverage and those member of a union. The positive returns
to pension coverage contradict the predictions of the theory of equalizing
di¤erences and of the spot contract pension literature27.
27See Bulow (1982).
255.2 Structural Probit Estimates
The …nal step in the procedure is the maximum likelihood estimation of the
individual probability of inter…rm jobmobility, as expressedby the structural
probit equation (14)28. This requires computation of the predicted log wage
di¤erential for each individual given his/her own characteristics, as in (13):
The structural probit allows us to disentangle the coe¢cients of the mobility
costs equation from e¤ects working through wages. The estimated structural
equation has a signi…cant power in explaining job mobility decisions. A like-
lihood ratio test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that all slope coe¢cients
are equal to zero. The parameter estimates reported in Table 10 represent
the e¤ect of a one unit change in the independent variable on the probability
of job mobility, evaluated at the sample mean29.
Generally, the coe¢cient estimates are consistent with a priori expecta-
tion. In particular, home owners are less likely to move. Experience and fam-
ily size negatively a¤ect mobility. Similarly, being married, having children
under 18, working in a large …rm and receiving employer provided training
have a negative impact on job mobility. However, these estimates are not
statistically signi…cant at any standard level.
28In the reported estimates, the base case individual is white, not married, without
children, house tenant, not enrolled in any individual pension plan nor in any employer
provided pension or health insurance plan, not receiving …rm speci…c training, not union-
ized, working in a small …rm.
29Standard errors are derived from a standard White variance covariance matrix. Re-
ported t-values followed by one (two) asterisks are signi…cant at 90 (95) percent level.
26Our model assumes that an individual’s decision to change jobs responds
positively to wage di¤erential de…ned as her/his lifetime earning gains from
moving. The positive and highly signi…cant wage di¤erentials estimate con-
stitutes a robust evidence in support of this model. However, our model
suggests that the response to wage di¤erentials accounts on average for a
modest 1.7 percent of the observed mobility. In our model, the e¤ect of
pension coverage is captured by pension coverage dummies (either de…ned
bene…t or de…ned contribution). In addition, our speci…cation also includes
a pension loss variable to disentangle the e¤ect of backloading of de…ned
bene…t pensions on mobility.
Our results reveal that being employed in a pension covered job, regard-
less of the nature of the plan, signi…cantly reduces the probability of moving
by about 20 percent. On the contrary, our estimation results suggest that on
average, pension backloading further reduces the mobility of de…ned bene…t
pension covered workers only by 0.5 percent. In addition, the coe¢cient is
not statistically signi…cant. This result gives very little support to the im-
plicit contract view that potential pension wage loss deters mobility. Our
…nding that the e¤ect of de…ned contribution plan is equally important than
the overall e¤ect of de…ned bene…t plan in shaping mobility decisions rein-
forces this conclusion. Indeed, if backloading loss were the main cause of
the lower mobility of pension covered workers, one would observe a much
larger mobility rate among workers covered by de…ned contribution plans
than among those covered by de…ned bene…t plan.
27Our estimated e¤ect of the pension variables seems to corroborate ear-
lier …ndings reported by Gustman and Steinmeier (1993). These authors
argue that rather than pension losses, it is the existence of a compensation
premium associated with pension covered jobs which mostly a¤ects mobility.
Our …nding of the existence of positive wage returns accruing to workers cov-
ered by employer provided pension is further evidence supporting the view
that compensation premiums are an important factor in explaining the lower
mobility rate of pension covered workers. Additional support for the idea
that fringe bene…ts associated with pension covered jobs play an important
role in the job mobility decision is found in the estimated coe¢cients on the
healthinsurance and union coveragevariables, whichare foundto be negative
and statistically signi…cant.
Previous research on the question of whether workers covered by em-
ployer provided health insurance are ”locked” into their jobs has produced
contradictory results despite the widespread similarity in methodological ap-
proaches and the use of similar datasets. In particular, two previous studies
have used SIPP data: while Penrod (1995) produces little empirical evidence
of a mobility impeding role of employer provided health insurance, Buch-
mueller and Valletta (1996) …nd evidence of job lock among women, but
not among men30. While not addressing explicitly the ”job lock” hypothe-
sis and its identi…cation strategies, our results provide further evidence that
employer provided health insurance represents a valuable fringe bene…t to
30See Currie and Madrian (1999) for a review of the ”job lock” literature.
28workers which signi…cantly deters job mobility.
As mentioned earlier, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced, starting from
1989, the vesting period required to be entitled to any pension bene…t. This
policy change reduced the loss incurred by workers covered by de…nedbene…t
plans associated with a job change31. Therefore, one should expect a lower
impact of pension portability loss on moving after the implementation of the
reform. We try to capture this e¤ect by predicting the change in mobility
that can be attributed to the policy change for workers who have been in
the same job between …ve and ten years and who are covered by de…ned
bene…t plan in the 1992 survey year. Our basic results are reported in Table
12. We …nd that the e¤ect of the reform on the average pension loss is
important reducing the later by 46 percent, or $5430. However, our model
also suggests that each 1000 dollars of pension loss reduces the probability of
switching jobs by about 0.03 percent. Thus, on average the reform increased
the mobility probability by only 0.015 percent. This result suggests that the
dramatic reduction of the vesting period imposed by the Tax Reform Act
had an insigni…cant impact on mobility choices.
One may argue that this conclusion seems inconsistent with the ”macro”
evidence reported in Tables 3 to 5 by noticing that the aggregate mobility
rate of de…ned bene…t covered workers rose from 12.2% to 15.8% between
31The portability loss variable is computed on a typical …nal salary DB plan, whose
characteristics are reported in table 11. Table 11 also reports the actuarial assumptions
needed for the calculation.
291986 and 1990. However, our aggregate …gures also indicate a similar in-
crease in the mobility rates of both de…ned contribution workers (13% to
15.3%) and non-covered workers (27.8% to 32.7%) over this period. Thus,
the macro evidence is consistent with our behavioural estimates and the mo-
bility increases between 1986 and 1990 seem to be part of an overall trend
rather than a policy response.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides anempirical analysis of occupational pensionportability
in the UnitedStates, groundedon astructural econometric model ofinter…rm
job mobility.
We …nd that workers covered by de…ned bene…t pensions are signi…cantly
less likely to move. However, the potential portability loss arising to work-
ers leaving a de…ned bene…t plan does not seem to play a signi…cant role in
explaining job mobility choices. Our results also reveal that de…ned contribu-
tion plans, despite of their complete portability, are as important as de…ned
bene…t plans in reducing job mobility. Employer provided health insurance
and union coverage are also found to play a major role in deterring job mo-
bility. As in Gustman and Steinmeier (1993), these results undermine the
argument that the lack of pension portability is a key factor in explaining
the lower mobility rate observed among workers in pension covered jobs. Ev-
idence of compensation premiums in pension and health insurance covered
30jobs further supports the alternative view that workers in ”good jobs” are
simply less likely tomove. From a policy perspective, these results cast doubt
on the e¤ectiveness of reforms aimed at improving labour market e¢ciency
through portability measures.
In the context of a national pension policy focused on the reduction of
social security bene…ts, a more convincing argument in favour of increased
pension portability would be to ensure retirement income adequacy for mul-
tiple job changers. The e¤ect of the reduction in the vesting period imple-
mented with the 1986 Tax Reform Act clearly illustrates the latter point.
Although we found that the reform did not a¤ect mobility, the average pen-
sion loss of workers a¤ected by the reform was reduced by 46 percent. On the
other hand, one may question the need to increase pension portability since
pension covered jobs are also associated with a higher remuneration levels
(Gustman and Steinmeier (1993)). If one is concerned with the adequacy
of pension income after retirement, a more equitable policy goal may be to
address the observed decline in pension coverage.
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36Table 1: Pension Coverage by Survey Years
SIPP84 SIPP86 SIPP90 SIPP92
Not Covered 31.19 34.63 37.46 35.44
Pension Covered 68.81 65.37 62.54 64.56
S ource: Our elaboration on SIPP data.
Table 2: Pension Coverage by Plan Type and Survey Years
SIPP variables SIPP 84 SIPP 86 SIPP 90 SIPP 92
DB plan De…ned Bene…t 39.53 31.38 19.62 23.72
DC plan Pro…t Sharing (PS) 14.27 15.13 10.45 N/A
401k plan 3.50 5.59 13.79 14.88
Other DC plan 5.88 4.70 3.29 7.69
DB + DC DB and PS or 401k 5.63 8.58 15.40 18.28
Not Covered 31.19 34.63 37.46 35.44
Source: Our elaboration on SIPP data.
37Table 3: Job Mobility, Wages and Pension Coverage 1984
No Pension DB DC DB+DC
Stayer Mover Stayer Mover Stayer Mover Stayer Mover
Mobility Rate 29.1 12.1 15.3 9
Hourly wage 12.8 12.6 16.4 16.1 16.4 15.5 20.4 20.5
¢Wage % 0.6 2.9 -0.7 3.8 1.1 1.6 -0.8 1.4
Source: Our elaboration on SIPP data
Table 4: Job Mobility, Wages and Pension Coverage 1986
No Pension DB DC DB+DC
Stayer Mover Stayer Mover Stayer Mover Stayer Mover
Mobility Rate 27.8 12.2 13 8.4
Hourly wage 12.9 11.6 15.8 15.2 17.3 15.8 20 16.9
¢Wage % 4.4 9.6 -0.5 -4.8 -6.2 -0.5 0.2 -3.4
Source: Our elaboration on SIPP data
Table 5: Job Mobility, Wages and Pension Coverage 1990
No Pension DB DC DB+DC
Stayer Mover Stayer Mover Stayer Mover Stayer Mover
Mobility Rate 32.7 15.8 15.3 10.9
Hourly wage 12.7 11.1 15.9 14.6 16.5 16.2 18.5 16.6
¢Wage % 0.4 2.3 0.7 -1.9 -0.6 -1.8 -0.2 -1
Source: Our elaboration on SIPP data
38Table 6: Job Mobility, Wages and Pension Coverage 1992
No Pension DB DC DB+DC
Stayer Move Stayer Mover Stayer Mover Stayer Mover
Mobility Rate 30.9 13.6 14.3 8.1
Hourly wage 12.4 11.9 15.5 14.9 16.4 15.5 20.4 20.4
¢Wage % 0.8 2 -0.1 -7.9 1.1 1.6 -0.8 1.4
Source: Our elaboration on SIPP data
Table 7: Pension coverage of movers in SIPP 84 and SIPP 86
Period 2 (wave 7)
Period 1 (wave 4) Not covered Covered
Not covered 90% 10%
Covered 86% 14%
Source: Our elaboration on SIPP data.
39Table 8: Reduced Form Probit Equation
dF/dx z
Housing tenure -0.01772** -2.3
Married 0.00046 0.05
Family size -0.00909 -0.93
Children under 18 0.00574** 2.13
Expected portability loss -0.00054 -0.06
Primary de…ned bene…t 1 -0.05650** -5.39
Primary de…ned bene…t 2 0.39196** 18.22
Primary de…ned contribution 1 -0.37144** -32.64
Primary de…ned contribution 2 0.32742** 19.39
Employer health insurance 1 -0.36526** -32.99
Employer health insurance 2 -0.04538** -4.4
Employer training -0.03937** -3.83
Employer size>100 0.01769* 1.95
Union 1 0.00133 0.18
Union 2 0.05036** 3.26
Experience 0.00745 0.54
Experience squared -0.00023 -0.07
Education -0.00001 -0.07
Manufacturing 0.00431** 2.82
Managers and professionals -0.02554** -3.56








Number of observations 10.199
40Table 9: Wage Equation for Stayers and Movers
Stayer Mover
t-test t-test
Experience 0.0129** 2.78 0.0155 1.47
Experience*squared -0.0001 -1.24 -0.0003 -1.03
Education 0.0577** 24.88 0.0533** 10.06
Non-white -0.1892** -12.17 -0.2032** -6.08
Primary de…ned bene…t 0.0772** 4.50 0.2773** 4.08
Primary de…ned contribution 0.0752** 4.28 0.2799** 4.18
Employer health insurance 0.1315** 7.71 0.2516** 9.96
Manufacturing 0.0243** 2.34 0.0748** 2.88
Union member 0.0835** 6.61 0.1495** 4.62
Managers and professionals 0.1794** 12.58 0.2474** 7.53
White collars -0.0072 -0.57 -0.0421 -1.50
Smsa 0.1126** 11.03 0.0799** 3.40
North-east 0.0373** 2.72 0.0896** 2.75
South 0.0058 0.47 -0.0125 -0.43
West 0.0814** 5.67 0.0504 1.54
Lambda 0.2359** 4.62 -0.1050** -4.47
Constant 1.3954** 21.36 1.3407** 9.82
F-test 182.41 44.94
Adj. R2 0.2948 0.2997
Root MSE 0.41756 0.47796
Number of observations 8247 1952
41Table 10: Structural Form Probit Equation
dF/dx z
Wage di¤erential 1.3480** 41.62
Housing tenure -0.0096 -1.21
Married -0.0043 -0.42
Non-white 0.0362** 3.19
Family size -0.0028 -0.98
Children under 18 -0.0067 -0.69
Union member 1 -0.0840** -10.56
Expected portability loss*1000 -0.0003 -1.2
Primary de…ned bene…t -0.2021** -17.37
Primary de…ned contribution -0.2037** -25.07
Empoyer health insurance 1 -0.1027** -10.48
Employer training -0.0125 -1.42
Employer size>100 -0.0052 -0.66
Experience -0.0003 -0.09





Number of observations 10.199
Table 11: Assumptions for Portability Loss Computation
Annual Accrual Rate 1.5%
Pensionable Wage Final Wage
Normal Retirement Age 62
Expected In‡ation Rate 3%
Expected Nominal Wage Growth Rate 5%
Post-Retirement Indexation 0.33%
Early Leavers’ Indexation no
Nominal Discount Rate 5%
In‡ation Adjusted Discount Rate 4%
42Table 12: Predicted e¤ect of the change in vesting rule onindividual mobility
de…ned bene…t covered movers in SIPP 1992, 5 · job tenure < 10
Average pre-reform pension wage loss $17.189
Average post-reform pension wage loss $11.745
¢ in pension wage loss -46.3%
¢ on predicted individual mobility -0.015%
Dollar amounts are expressed in 1992 dollars.
43